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BAR BRIEFS
(Continued from Preceeding Page)
It was suggested that we have papers prepared and presented to
the convention on the following subjects: (1) Administrative
Law, which would deal with the growth of bureaucratic govern-
ment, and with the possibility of securing legislation providing
for appeal from decisions of the bureaus to our courts. (2) Pre-
ference of government claims in estates. (3) Socialized medicine,
from a legal viewpoint. (4) Pre-trial procedure, and (5) Sol-
diers' and Sailors' Relief Act. After the presentation of each
paper the matter would be open for general discussion by the
convention.
If any member of the bar has in mind any subject that he
feels would be of particular interest, we should be glad to have
him write either me or to our Secretary. As soon as our pro-
gram is completed it will be published in Bar Briefs.
I trust that as many of our attorneys as possible will plan to
attend this meeting. There are many grave problems confront-
ing our attorneys these days, and we need to get together and
discuss these problems, and to receive inspiration for the tasks
that lie ahead.
0. B. HERIGSTAD, President
BOOKS AND OFFICE EQUIPMENT
Any member interested in the purchase of Northwestern Re-
porter-first 300 Volumes; the latest Northwestern Digest, mis-
cellaneous text books, and a complete set of office equipment
write Myer R. Shark of Devils Lake, N. D.
A BRIEF SURVEY OF COURT DECISIONS
CONSTRUING THE NORTH DAKOTA BILL OF RIGHTS
By Prof. Ross C. Tisdale
(Continued from last issue)
SECTION 5
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus-
pended unless when in case of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require.
As intimated by Justice Burr in State ex rel. Cleveringa v.
Klein, supra, page 1, Section 5 of the Bill of Rights was intended
to protect citizens against "star chamber processes." The right
to personal freedom' was considered "the birthright of every free-
'. See Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., (1927), p. 710: ". . .Per-
sonal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation,
or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may
direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.
It appears, therefore, that this power of locomotion is not entirely unre-
stricted, but that by due course of law certain qualifications and limita-
tions may be imposed upon it without infringing upon constitutional lib-
erty. Indeed, in organized society, liberty is the creature of law, and every
man will possess it in proportion as the laws, while imposing no unneces-
sary restraints, surrounds him and every other citizen with protections
against the lawless acts of others."
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man" at common law. But in medieval times the power of the
King, the Courts and of Parliament were not clearly defined. True,
the courts recognized the principle, but being appointed at the
King's pleasure, they could or would not always give relief against
illegal detentions. The picture was further complicated by the
development of the Court of Star Chamber,' which, dominated
ultimately by the privy council, and intimately connected with
the King's purse, enforced the royal will by imprisoning at will,
persons whose conduct was considered inimical to the will of the
sovereign. Abuses became so great that the Habeas Corpus Act
was passed in 1679.' Its purpose was to compel prompt action in
any case in which illegal imprisonment was alleged. While the
Act gave no new right to the subject, it did furnish a guide for
the enforcement of already existing rights. It is recognized in
the constitution of every state, and is "one of the principal safe-
guards to personal liberty."
SECTION 6
All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for
capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption
great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted. Wit-
nesses shall not be unreasonably detained, nor be confined in any
room where criminals are actually imprisoned.
This provision of the constitution "guarantees the right to
bail before the trial in capital cases, unless the the proof of the
commission of the capital offense is evident or the presumption
thereof is great; and . . . .does not forbid bail in a capital case
where the proof of gilt is evident or the presumption thereof is
great. On the one hand, the constitution itself does not give the
right to bail in the class of cases last mentioned; and, on the
other hand, the constitution does not inhibit the legislature from
doing so ....
But, in ruling that the petitioner is not entitled to bail as a
matter of strict legal right, this court does not hold that bail
may not be granted the petitioner at all or for any reason ....
The application may be either granted or refused, in the exercise
of a sound judicial discretion." Wallin, C. J., in State ex rel,
West v. Collins, 10 N. D. 464, 467, 88 N. W. 88, 89 (1901) (Mur-
der, habeas corpus): Cited and followed in State v. Hartzell, 13
N. D. 356, 100 N. W. 745 (1904).
However, this Section does not entitle one convicted of a
capital offense, to bail pending appeal. The constitutional pro-
vision refers to bail before conviction. State v. Tucker, 57 N. D.
508, 222 N. W. 651 (1928).
The provision in Section 6 regarding excessive fines does not
render invalid a statute providing for the amercement of a sheriff
'. See Holdsworth's History of English Law, Vol. 1, pp. 493-516; and, The
Story of the Habeas Corpus, by Edward Jenks, Selected Essays in Anglo-
American Legal History, Vol. II, pp. 531-548.
'. See Bailey on Habeas Corpus (1913) Vol. 1, pp. 2-6.
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for failure to make return of a writ of execution on the return
day. "The recovery, though penal in its nature, is in no sense a
fine, but merely the damages which the law adjudges to the in-
dividual as the consequence of the failure of an officer to dis-
charge an official duty .... The liability .... is not a punishment
for crime. It is a condition upon the holding of the office, and a
penalty, not so much imposed, but agreed by the sheriff to be
paid in the case of a failure of duty....
(Continued in next issue)
LICENSED ATTORNEYS LIST
The list of licensed attorneys for 1944 will be submitted to
the printer on May 15th, and in order that attorneys names ap-
pear in the list the fee should be paid by that time.
REQUEST TO ALL MEMBERS
Please forward names of attorneys recently entering the
Armed Forces, to J. H. Newton, Secretary State Bar Board,
Bismarck, N. D.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In State of North Dakota, Pltf. and Respt. vs Gabriel Tennyson, Deft.
and Applt.
That Section 10522, C. L. 1913, fixing the period of limitation for the
prosecution of a misdemeanor, is not a statute of repose but creates a
bar to the prosecution and the time within which such an offense is com-
mitted thus becomes a jurisdictional fact.
That the state has ithe burden of proving affirmatively the commis-
sion of an offense charged within the period limited for its prosecution.
That where on the face of an information it appears -that the offense
charged was not committed within the period limited for its prosecution,
a motion ,to vacate and set aside a judgment of conviction entered on a
plea of guilty and for a new trial should be granted.
Appeal from the District Court of Mercer County, Berry, J. From an
order denying his motion to vacate and set aside the judgment of conviction
and order a new trial, defendant appeals. REVERSED. Opinion of the
Court by Nuessle, J.
In State of North Dakota, Pltf. and Respt. vs Gabriel Tennyson, Deft.
and Aplt.
That a court has no jurisdiction in the first instance to try a charge
of larceny made pursuant to section 9928, C. L. 1913 on account of the
stealing of property in another country and 'bringing it into the State
of North Dakota unless such property is brought into or through the
county in which the prosecution is had.
That where a judgment of conviction is entered on his plea of guilty
against a defendant who appears without counsel, and on his motion to
vacate and set aside such judgment, order a new trial, and permit him
to withdraw his plea, it appears that the court had no jurisdiction to try
the offense charged, and such motion should be granted. Appeal from
the District Court of Mercer County, Berry, J. From an order denying
his motion to vacate and set aside the judgment of conviction and order
a new trial, defendant appeals. REVERSED. Opinion of the court by
Nuessle, J.
